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This study discusses the evolution of personal wealth in transition economies. While 
data availability is still a problem, the available indirect evidence suggests privatization 
has resulted in an increase in personal wealth but also in personal wealth inequality, 
especially in the countries that lagged behind in building effective institutions. Another 
source of wealth inequality is the high income inequality due to wage decompression 
coupled with the low saving rates among the poor. We pay a special attention to one of 
the most noticeable implications of this rise in personal wealth and wealth inequality—
the emergence of so called ‘oligarchs’. Using the comprehensive dataset of Muscovites’ 
incomes we show that surveys that do not take into account the first- and second-tier 
rich (billionaires and millionaires) may drastically underestimate inequality. 
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1 Introduction 
Transition from plan to market is a natural experiment of historical significance. It has 
affected economic relationships, social and political structures and, what is most 
important, the lives of 1.5 billion people in almost 30 countries. While the 
transformational recession, subsequent recovery and other aggregate processes have 
been studied extensively, our understanding of the evolution of personal wealth and of 
the distributional effects of transition is still far from complete. This is not because these 
issues are unimportant. Transition countries are, on average, rather wealthy. Figure 1 
and Table 1 show the standing of transition countries in terms of wealth with regard to 
other economies comparable per capita GDP.1 Unlike the pre-transition years, much of 
this wealth is now owned by individuals. Privatization has provided many citizens of 
transition countries with property rights for assets they were de facto controlling and 
using during the communist era.  
Figure 1: Transition countries are on average richer than other countries with 
comparable per capita income 
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Note: The graph presents aggregate national wealth around the world and in transition countries in 2000. 
Source: World Bank (2005a). 
 
Yet, this wealth is not equally distributed among the citizens of post-communist 
countries which has significant implications for economic growth and sustainability of 
reforms. Indeed, inequality, both income and wealth inequality, has an important and  
 
                                                 
1 Figure 1 presents national wealth including natural resources, production capital, infrastructure but 
excluding human capital. The graph for production capital/GDP looks similar.   2

























Albania  17 199    1 745  5 637 
Armenia  15 294         
Azerbaijan  11 447         
Belarus  25 447         
Bulgaria  22 866  1381  5 303  8 751 
Croatia  29 437  6198       
Czech Rep.  25 697  7564       
Estonia  31 180    18 685  24 967 
Georgia  21 115    595  2 394 
Hungary  38 411  6222  15 480  20 427 
Kazakhstan  23 348         
Kyrgyzstan  9 745         
Latvia  27 468    12 979  18 464 
Lithuania  29 091         
Macedonia  24 144         
Moldova  11 577    4 338  7 598 
Poland  35 566  4493       
Romania  22 127  818  8 495  13 003 
Russia  25 755  1136  15 593  32 809 
Slovak Rep.  35 786  4236       
Slovenia  46 461         
Tajikistan  5 443         
Ukraine  15 141         
China  11 965    2 956   5 179 
France  83 016    57 814  64 150 
Germany  89 871    68 678  73 124 
Italy  119 704    51 943  56 621 
UK  124 861    55 239  62 406 
Euro zone     54300       
Canada  89 252    54 226  88 997 
Japan  115 237    150 258  151 771 
US  147 665    79 851  94 603 
Sources: 
1Davis et al. (2006) (predicted or actual, PPP adjusted); 
2Unicredit (2006), 
3World Bank (2005a) 
(PPP adjusted). 
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lasting effect on the institutional change (Glaeser et al. 2003; Sonin 2003). Moreover, as 
financial markets are imperfect,2 wealth inequality is crucial for economic development, 
as wealth-constrained entrepreneurs cannot implement their business ideas. Banerjee 
and Newman (1993) show that in the absence of an effective court system and well-
functioning financial markets wealth inequality breeds wealth inequality and may lock 
the economy in an underdevelopment trap.  
 
The research on wealth inequality is plagued by an array of data problems (Davies and 
Shorrocks 2005). First, there are no consistent microeconomic data on personal wealth 
for transition countries. Whatever data are available are not comparable neither cross-
country nor over time. The wealth data for the pre-transition period are problematic for 
a number of reasons (see next section). Also, transition has been accompanied by a 
substantial growth of informal sector (Shleifer and Treisman 2005). What is more 
important, the growth of informal sector may have been very different in different 
countries (Alexeyev and Pyle 2003) and cannot be accurately measured (Hanousek and 
Palda 2005). Even given the imperfect data, there are a few strands of studies that 
promote our understanding of wealth inequality in transition.  
 
First, as much of personal wealth distribution today is driven by the privatization 
process, the existing research on privatization provides important insights. Although the 
scholars of privatization also complain about the lack of data, substantial progress has 
been made (Megginson 2005; Guriev and Megginson 2006). In addition to privatization 
of industrial assets, the reforms have also transferred real estate to urban citizens and 
farm land to farmers. Prior to transition, socialist economies provided each citizen with 
a virtually free access to public housing. Transition has transformed these rights-to-use 
into private property rights essentially creating a market for real estate—consistent with 
the logic of De Soto (2002). In addition to registering the private property titles, 
transition has resulted in a significant increase of supply of housing in real terms. For 
example in Russia, a country traditionally plagued by the lack of housing, an average 
citizen has seen a 20 per cent increase in terms of per capita square meters during 1990-
2004. The transfer of housing has contributed to an increase in wealth inequality as the 
value of housing in different locations varies greatly.3 
 
Second, there is substantial research on one of the most intriguing phenomena in 
transition: the emergence of a handful of super rich tycoons in Russia—so called 
‘oligarchs’. Out of 691 billionaires in the Forbes list of 2005, 27 are from Russia, by far 
                                                 
2 See Appendix on the degree of financial development in transition countries.  
3 This is certainly a measurement issue—except for the De Soto’s collateral argument, the rental service 
flow was the same before transition. Yet, as the differences in the value of the rental service flows were 
not properly measured, transition has resulted in an observed increase in inequality. See Yemtsov (2006) 
for a thorough empirical study of the effect of housing privatization on inequality in Poland, Serbia and 
Russia. Gustafsson and Li (2001) argue that in China much of the urban-rural inequality is due to the high 
value of the user rights for urban real estates that urban workers obtain at low rates.    4
many more than from the other transition countries combined, including China 
(Figure 2).4 It is interesting to compare Russia’s standing in the Forbes Billionaire List 
and in the World Wealth Report that cover the ‘second-tier rich’—individuals with at 
least US$1 million in financial assets. While Russia has 4 per cent of the world’s 
billionaires both in terms of wealth and number of individuals, there are only 103,000 
Russian millionaires (only 1.2 per cent of the world’s total) who have about US$670 
billion wealth (2 per cent of the world’s total).5 The comparison of the Forbes List and 
the World Wealth Report suggests that there is a huge inequality at the very the top end 
of Russia’s wealth distribution: 25 Russian oligarchs have about 12 per cent of the 
combined wealth of 103 thousand Russian millionaires.6  
 
How and why did these ‘oligarchs’ arise? Why did they emerge in Russia but not in 
other transition countries? What is the impact of their wealth on the economic 
development of Russia? We address these issues in detail below. 
Figure 2: Russians in the Forbes’ billionaires list 
Russians in the Forbes List 
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Note: Forbes estimates of the billionaires wealth are shown at the date of the publication of the list. The 
numbers next to bars indicate the number of Russian individuals in the Forbes list. 
Source: Forbes (2002-2006), Russian Trading System website (www.rts.ru), and authors’ calculations.  
                                                 
4 Actually, in the 2005 Forbes list, the total wealth of all non-Russian billionaires from transition 
countries (including China but excluding Hong Kong) was below the wealth of the single richest Russian. 
In 2004, the wealth of 26 Russian billionaires was about 19 per cent of Russian GDP; the total wealth of 
all 262 US billionaires was just 7 per cent USA GDP. The role of oligarchs increased even further in 2006 
when their wealth doubled to US$174 billion (23 per cent Russian GDP). 
5 The 2005 World Wealth Report does not provide an estimate of the total wealth of Russian billionaires. 
We use the numbers of 544 and 573 billions for the 2002 and 2003 mentioned in the presentation of the 
2004 World Wealth Report (Vedomosti 2004) and extrapolate them for the next year.  
6 The World Wealth Report (2005) is based on 2004 data; hence it has to be compared to the Forbes List 
in 2004 when Russia had 25 billionaires jointly owning US$80 billion.   5
 
Third, the income inequality is studied and understood very well. Milanovic (1998) 
provides a comprehensive analysis of income inequality in transition based on the 
comparable data from household surveys in transition. Figure 3 illustrates the variety of 
transition experiences in terms of increases in income inequality.7  
Figure 3: Income inequality Gini estimates are made in 1996-2002 period, for most 
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Source: World Development Indicators. 
 
Given that prior to transition personal wealth inequality as well as personal wealth per 
se were quite low, the current wealth inequality is essentially a function of income 
inequality during the transition process. As transition countries are essentially middle 
income countries, the poor face a subsistence constraint, so that within each economy, 
the savings rates increase with income. Figure 4 shows that the lower half of Russian 
income distribution essentially saves nothing or even dissaves; the savings rates are 
substantial only in the top income quartile. The lower saving rates by the poor imply 
that the wealth inequality is much higher than income inequality.   
 
This argument is incomplete without taking into account capital gains, in particular 
those on the public housing and productive assets transferred to private hands in the 
                                                 
7 This scatterplot is very intuitively divided into three clusters. Within each cluster there is a positive 
correlation between levels of income and inequality (interestingly, the relationship between changes in 
Gini and per capita is actually negative; Keane and Prasad 2002). One cluster is the advanced transition 
countries except Poland, the other one is the war-torn countries plus resource-rich Russia and 
Turkmenistan; other countries are in the third cluster. The fact that Poland is in the intermediate cluster 
may be explained by the high pre-transition inequality: actually the change in Poland’s Gini was very 
small (Keane and Prasad 2002).   6
course of transition. While there is no data for such an adjustment, it would probably 
further increase the estimated inequality. Indeed, the opportunities to earn higher 
income would be higher for individuals, regions, and sectors where such assets are more 
valuable and vice versa.  
Figure 4: Majority of Russians saved very little or even dissaved during transition 
 
Note: The graph depicts savings rates (including durables) by income quartiles, based on Russian 
longitudinal monitoring survey (RLMS) survey, Rounds V-X (1994-2001).  
Source: Foley and Pyle (2005). 
 
2  Initial conditions  
Our knowledge of inequality in the socialist economies is highly incomplete. The first 
problem is the lack of primary data. The official data have not been collected, so the 
most reliable information on inequality has come from the emigrant surveys. Ofer and 
Vinokur (1992) have surveyed 1,250 Soviet Jewish emigrants to Israel who provided 
information on their wealth prior to their decision to emigrate. These surveys suffer 
from two important methodological problems. The emigrants are certainly not a 
representative sample. Among other things, their decision to emigrate could be linked to 
their low wealth (it is therefore not surprising that 58 per cent of emigrants in the survey 
had no assets at all). Ofer and Vinokur recognize these problems and suggest that one 
should be very careful interpreting their wealth inequality estimates (indeed, the 0.7-0.8 
Gini coefficient for the wealth distribution obtained by Ofer and Vinokur is strongly 
influenced by the large share of assetless migrants).  
 
The other more important problem is that the pecuniary income/wealth inequality does 
not measure the true inequality of living standards in a command economy. First, there 
have been many missing markets (including real estate and financial markets). Second, 
the real inequality is not in having the wealth but in the ability to use this wealth to buy 
goods in shortage at state prices. These were driven by connections which in turn were a   7
function of one’s standing in the Soviet hierarchy.8 The acuteness of shortage differed 
geographically. Those residing in larger cities would have access to much better 
provision of goods in stores. The mobility was constrained through the system of 
residence permits, so that relocation to a large city was a crucial non-monetary 
incentive. The factories also were happy to provide the skilled workers with fringe 
benefits such as good healthcare and housing—this legacy was still important during 
transition (Commander and Schankerman 1997; Friebel and Guriev 2005; Juurikkala 
and Lazareva 2004). Moreover, these problems differed across countries. While the 
share of public sector employment was very high everywhere, only in Yugoslavia and 
Poland public employment was below 90 per cent (Milanovic 1998), the share of private 
income varied from 5 to 25 per cent.  
Table 2: The share of private income in socialist economies before transition (1988-89) 
Income source   Czechoslovakia USSR  Bulgaria  Hungary  Yugoslavia  Poland 
Primary income   72.9  78.8  71.2  71.7  83.1  78.2 
Labour income   69.5  72.0  56.5  55.0  62.2  53.0 
Self-employment 
  income  
3.4 6.8  14.7  14.0  20.9  25.2 
Property income   n.a.  n.a. n.a.  2.7  n.a.  n.a. 
Social transfers   25.4  13.6  21.2  22.4  13.3  20.7 
Pensions   16.5  8.0  16.6  13.4  12.1  14.3 
Child benefits   5.6  1.2  2.3  6.0  1.2  5.2 
Other cash transfers   3.3  4.4  2.3  3.0  0.0  1.2 
Other income  1.7  7.6  7.6  6.0  3.6  1.1 
Gross income   100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Personal taxes   14.2  n.a.  n.a.  16.5  1.2  1.6 
Direct taxes   0.0  n.a. n.a.  10.7 1.2  1.6 
Payroll tax (employee)  14.2  0.0  0.0  5.8  0.0  0.0 
Private income  5.1  14.4 22.3  22.7  24.5  26.3 
Note: Private income is calculated as the self-employment income, property income and other income. 
Source: Milanovic (1998). 
3  Reform strategies and inequality 
One of the most commonly held beliefs about transition is that the rise of inequality is 
due to the reform and to privatization in particular. This argument is especially popular 
among the scholars of Russian transition (Stiglitz 2003) and goes as follows: Russian 
reform has channeled state assets into the hand of a few, drastically reduced the 
government funding of public goods therefore leaving majority of citizens at or below 
the subsistence levels. The existing evidence suggests that the situation is more 
                                                 
8 See Shleifer and Vishny (1994) for this theory explaining why centrally planned economies needed 
shortages to provide incentives.   8
involved. First, the income inequality has risen in all transition countries including 
China and Vietnam. Second, even in Russia the major increase in inequality occurred 
prior to privatization. Third, as shown by Milanovic (1999), most of the increase in 
income inequality in post-communist countries is due to wage decompression.9 Yet, all 
of the above refers to income inequality. The dynamics of wealth inequality was also 
driven by the privatization process. Transition countries have chosen very different 
privatization strategies (Megginson 2005): some (most importantly, Russia and Czech 
Republic) opted for voucher-based mass privatization, others sold in open auctions 
allowing foreigners to bid, some sold to insiders, some did not privatize at all.  
Figure 5: Change in Gini coefficient for transition countries and the contribution of 
wage decompression 
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Source: Milanovic (1999). 
 
The outcomes however do not depend very much on the privatization strategies. Rather, 
there is a clear distinction between Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and former Soviet 
Union (FSU) transition experiences—Berglof and Bolton (2002) refer to this distinction 
as the Great Divide of transition. For example, with all the difference between Polish 
and Czech privatization strategies, the ownership structures in these countries are 
converging (Grosfeld and Hashi 2003; see also the Appendix). Even though the Czech 
Republic has had its share of corporate governance scandals (Johnson et al. 2000), in the 
end of the day the market institutions have emerged as the country joined the EU. Also, 
Russia has privatized extensively and is now renationalizing important sectors of the 
economy.  
 
The simplest explanation of the Great Divide is the outside anchor of EU accession 
available to CEE countries. In these countries, the commitment to reforms was credible, 
while the FSU there has always been a fear of reversal and expropriation; the risk did 
                                                 
9 Milanovic’s study ends in the 1990s but the levels of inequality in transition economies have remained 
roughly constant since then.   9
materialize in Russia, Belarus, and some other countries. This has determined the choice 
of reform strategies. In order to provide demand for market institutions, reformers had 
to create a critical mass of private owners, and do that quickly. While the voucher 
privatization is suboptimal in terms of efficiency (Megginson 2005), it had to be 
implemented to make the reforms irreversible.10 On the other hand, as reformers did 
realize already in the beginning of reforms and as the empirical research on privatization 
showed later (Guriev and Megginson 2006), privatization works better in the presence 
of complementary reforms of market and state institutions. Therefore the reformers 
faced a chicken-and-egg problem. In Russia, they chose to launch a rapid mass 
privatization to transfer tens of thousands of industrial enterprises to private hands 
(usually to incumbents) within the course of a couple of years.11 Initially, the assets 
were owned by tens of millions of Russians, but the ownership quickly consolidated. As 
the market institutions were underdeveloped, there were huge ‘institutional economies 
of scale’—large owners have been able to influence the rules of the game through 
capturing regulators, courts and legislatures (Glaeser et al. 2003; Sonin 2003; Hellman 
et al. 2003; Slinko et al. 2005). Hence the shares changed hands from workers and 
retired workers to managers or outside majority owners.12  
 
The next wave of privatization was the so-called loans-for-shares programme. This 
programme was designed to overcome the parliament-imposed ban on privatization of 
mining industries. The government did not sell the assets; rather, government borrowed 
cash from private banks using the assets as collateral; as the government never intended 
to pay back, the assets were actually transferred to the bankers. As the auctions were run 
by the banks themselves, they were rigged and the assets were privatized at a small 
fraction of their market value (Freeland 2000).13 Both loans-for-shares privatization and 
post-voucher-privatization consolidation of ownership resulted in an emergence of a 
few large business groups each owned by handful of entrepreneurs known as oligarchs.  
4 Oligarchs   
According to Plato, ‘oligarchy’ is a form of government by a small group; Plato 
distinguished oligarchs from nobles as the latter are few but rightful rulers while 
                                                 
10 The risk of policy reversal was the major factor for not adopting China’s gradualist approach. The 
renationalization of a few key enterprises in 2004-05 implies that this risk was and still is very tangible. 
Unfortunately for the reformers, the rise in inequality due to hasty privatization has only strengthened 
public support for policy reversal. 
11 Beck and Laeven (2006) show that the institutional challenges were especially important in transition 
countries with natural resources and with many years under communism. Russia has both. 
12 One of the important factors in this process was the spread of wage arrears in Russia in the mid 1990s 
(Earle and Sabirianova 2002). As workers were not paid wages in time, they were desperate to get cash 
and sold their shares at very low prices.  
13 The important factor was the 1996 presidential elections; loans-for-shares helped Yeltsin enlist support 
of the bankers (future oligarchs) as these assets would remain their property only in case of Yeltsin’s 
victory.   10
oligarchs come to power unlawfully. In its current meaning in Russia, the term 
‘oligarch’ denotes a large businessman who controls sufficient resources to influence 
rules of the game—politics, regulation, and judiciary—to further their fortunes. As 
mentioned, transition has created oligarchs in Russia but not in other post-communist 
countries. Russia differs from other transition countries in several important respects. 
First, it holds vast natural resources which creates enormous potential for rent-seeking. 
Second, unlike the CEE countries, it has spent more time under communism; it was 
therefore more difficult to rebuild market institutions (no living Russian had memory of 
life in a capitalist economy). Besides, Russia did not have an outside anchor such as EU 
accession that has created commitment to building these institutions in the CEE. Third, 
Russia has undertaken a democratic and decentralized path of political reform which 
allowed for private agents to build their estates independent of the rulers. The latter 
factor is important for understanding the difference between Russia on one hand and 
authoritarian post-Soviet regimes, on the other. While the latter have successfully 
eliminated all private oligarchs, it is not clear how much wealth has been amassed by 
the rulers themselves. Due to the oppression of free press, such data are not available 
but even the sketchy evidence suggests that the post-Soviet authoritarian rulers are rich 
enough to be considered the ‘ultimate oligarchs’ within their own countries.14 
 
These distinguishing features of Russia’s economy have predetermined the emergence 
of Russian oligarchs. While the conventional wisdom is that the Russian oligarchs were 
created by the loans-for-shares scheme discussed above, this is only a part of the 
picture. Indeed, among the 22 business groups listed in Table 3, only three (led by 
Potanin, Abramovitch and Khodorkovsky) owe their fortunes to this particular event as 
they have used the loans-for-shares auctions to acquire the crown jewels of the mining 
industry. Two more oligarchs—then industry incumbents Bogdanov and Alekperov—
have used loans-for-shares to reinforce their control over their own enterprises. Others 
have risen through voucher privatization or through purchasing privatized firms from 
incumbents.15 Moreover, the first list of omnipotent tycoons of Russia—the so-called 
‘Berezovsky’s Group of Seven’—included four businessmen who actually lost all loans-
for-shares tenders they took part in. 
                                                 
14 One of the most liberal of these rulers, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has allegedly tunneled 
at least U$1 billion of oil export revenues to one of his private accounts; his family controls many other 
key enterprises in the country (Kramner and Norris 2005; Hiatt 2005). Another common example is 
Ukraine where three groups (those of Taruta, Akhmetov and Pinchuk) have become the pillars of 
President Kuchma’s regime (not surprisingly, Kuchma is Pinchuk’s father-in-law) and did suffer a certain 
fallout after the Orange Revolution of 2004. Gorodnichenko and Grygorenko (2005) list 13 Ukrainian 
oligarchs (including Pinchuk, Ahmetov and Taruta) who jointly control about 40 per cent of the 
Ukrainian economy. Yet only three of them—the very same Pinchuk, Ahmetov and Taruta—showed up 
in the Forbes list.  
15 Guriev et al. (2006) track all the private Russian owners in the World Bank’s (2004) dataset and find 
that 42 per cent Russian firms were controlled in 2003 by owners who were industry insiders at the 
beginning of transition; 48 per cent of the firms are controlled by owners who have served in high 
government positions at some point in 1990s. The preliminary evidence in this paper suggests that while 
political connections help to get better assets, the politically-connected owners are less efficient owners in 
terms of productivity growth.   11
Table 3 is borrowed from Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) who used a unique dataset on 
ownership of Russian industry in 2003 to classify the largest owners as oligarchs. In 
their sample covering about 75 per cent of Russian industry, the 22 oligarchs control 
about 40 per cent of sales and employment. It is therefore not surprising to see 
astonishing estimates of their personal wealth in the Forbes list. What do we know 
about Russian oligarchs? First, they do control enterprises in natural resource industries 
and in protected industries such as automotive (Guriev and Rachinsky 2005). Their 
market shares in the industries that they control are very large. Yet, it should not be a 
concern for the antitrust policy as almost all of these industries produce globally 
tradable goods. What is more important is the ‘political antitrust’ (Rajan and Zingales 
2003) policies restricting the state capture by the large influential business groups. Even 
though the oligarchs are small in the global economy, they have a huge weight within 
Russia. 
Table 3: Russian oligarchs as of mid 2003 
Senior partner(s)  Holding company/firm,  
major sector(s) 
Employment, in 
thousands (% of 
sample) 
Sales, in billions 
of rubles (% of 
sample) 
Wealth, in 
US$ billions  
Oleg Deripaska  Base Element/RusAl, 
aluminum, auto 
169 (3.9)  65 (1.3)  4.5 
Roman Abramovich  Millhouse/Sibneft,  
oil 
169 (3.9)  203 (3.9)  12.5 
Vladimir Kadannikov  AutoVAZ,  
automotive 
167 (3.9)  112 (2.2)  0.8 




coal, pipes, chemical 
143 (3.3)  70 (1.4)  2.9 
Vagit Alekperov  Lukoil,  
oil 
137 (3.2)  475 (9.2)  5.6 
Alexei Mordashov  Severstal,  
steel, auto 





112 (2.6)  137 (2.6)  10.8 
Alexandr Abramov  Evrazholding,  
steel 
101 (2.3)  52 (1.0)  2.4 




94 (2.2)  121 (2.3)  9.4 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky  Menatep/Yukos,  
oil 
93 (2.2)  149 (2.9)  24.4 
Iskander Makhmudov  UGMK,  
non-ferrous metals 
75 (1.7)  33 (0.6)  2.1 
Vladimir Bogdanov  Surgutneftegaz,  
oil 
65 (1.5)  163 (3.1)  2.2 
Victor Rashnikov  Magnitogorsk Steel,  
steel 
57 (1.3)  57 (1.1)  1.3 
Igor Zyuzin  Mechel,  
steel, coal 
54 (1.3)  31 (0.6)  1.1   12
Vladimir Lisin  Novolipetsk Steel,  
steel 
47 (1.1)  39 (0.8)  4.8 





42 (1.0)  20 (0.4)  1 
Shafagat Tahaudinov  Tatneft,  
oil 
41 (1.0)  41 (0.8)  2.9 
Mikhail Fridman  Alfa/TNK-BP,  
oil 
38 (0.9)  107 (2.1)  5.2 
Boris Ivanishvili  Metalloinvest,  
ore 
36 (0.8)  15 (0.3)  8.8 
Kakha Bendukidze  United Machinery, 
engineering 





20 (0.5)  27 (0.5)  2.1 
David Yakobashvili, 




13 (0.3)  20 (0.4)  0.2 
Total    1,831 (42.4)  2,026 (39.1)   
Note and source: Employment and sales are from World Bank (2004) and Guriev and Rachinsky (2005). 
The percentages in parentheses is the share of employment/sales of the World Banks sample, that in turn 
covers a substantial share of the economy as discussed below. Wealth is the market value of the 
oligarchs’ stakes in spring 2004 calculated by authors using Forbes 2004 and stock market data. Wealth 
includes stakes of all the partners identified by the survey (in most cases, there is just one major owner, 
but in some cases there are 2-3 or even 7). Each entry lists the leading shareholder(s) in a respective 
business group, the name of the holding company or the flagship asset, and one or two major sectors. We 
report several individuals per group only when there is equal or near equal partnership. Ranking is based 
on employment in the sample and may therefore be different from actual, as the sample disproportionally 
covers assets of different oligarchs. Employment and sales are based on official firm-level data for 2001. 
The exchange rate was US$1=29 rubles. 
 
Most of the oligarchs in Table 3 are relatively young. The average/median Russian 
billionaire is about 45 years old, 20 years younger than an average/median billionaire in 
the USA. Most of them control majority or supermajority stakes in their companies 
which they are still actively managing. The absence of separation of ownership and 
control and resulting agency problems has provided the oligarchs with strong incentives 
to restructure their firms. Boone and Rodionov (2002) argue that since the oligarchs 
established—often through expropriation and dilution of other shareholders including 
the state—the control over their assets, they have been running them very well. This 
claim is consistent with preliminary evidence in Shleifer and Treisman (2005) and 
Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) who show that oligarchs seem to outperform other 
Russian owners and almost catch up with foreign owners.  
 
Moreover, consistently with reformer’s expectations, oligarchs began to lobby for 
certain further pro-market reforms (Guriev and Rachinsky 2005). This process however 
took more time than the reformers expected and was also less comprehensive. First (as 
suggested by Glaeser et al. 2003; Sonin 2003), oligarchs originally benefited from 
continued rent-seeking. Second, unlike robber barons in the USA, Russian oligarchs are 
a part of a globalized economy (a few oligarchs from Table 2 live in London, most   13
prominently Roman Abramovic), hence their commitment to building long-term 
security of property rights in Russia is rather limited.  
 
The oligarchs’ incentives are also weakened by the insecurity of their property rights. A 
median Russian voter deems oligarchs’ property rights illegitimate and supports their 
expropriation (see a discussion of poll data in Guriev and Rachinsky 2005; and 
Vedomosti 2003b). This is well understood by all Russian politicians who use the threat 
of expropriation to obtain political or pecuniary contributions from the oligarchs. In 
particular, President Putin has used the anti-oligarch sentiment in his campaign in 2000; 
once he came to power, he offered the oligarchs the following pact. As long as the 
oligarchs paid taxes and did not use their political power (at least not against Putin), 
Putin would respect their property rights and refrain from revisiting privatization.  This 
pact defined the ground rules of oligarchs’ interaction with central and regional 
government for Putin’s first term (2000-04). Although the pact could have never been 
written down, even general public was well aware of its existence. A poll by FOM (an 
independent non-profit Russian polling organization) a week after the meeting of Putin 
and the oligarchs showed that 57 per cent Russians knew about it.  
 
Putin proved the credibility of the expropriation threat in 2003, when the prominent 
oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the majority owner of the Yukos oil company, 
deviated from the pact by openly criticizing corruption in Putin’s administration16 and 
supporting opposition parties and independent media (Vedomosti, 2003a). He and his 
partners were soon arrested or forced into exile, and their stakes in Yukos expropriated. 
Khodorkovsky was sentenced to eight years in prison, and his personal estate is now 
estimated to be only 2 billion dollars (down from 15 billion dollars). 
 
The Yukos affair has clarified the rules of the game between oligarchs and the Kremlin. 
Oligarchs have learned the risks related to violating the pact, and so in the future, they 
will be less likely to interfere in national politics. Ironically, by crushing Russia’s most 
transparent company, Putin has pursued the ‘political antitrust’ policy that was crucial 
in building US democracy and economy in the beginning of twentieth century (Rajan 
and Zingales 2003). Even though oligarchs remain economically powerful, they have no 
longer any role in politics. This in turn removed any counterweights to bureaucracy 
which then followed a steady course for renationalization. The nationalization occurs 
through buyout of oligarch firms by state-owned companies. In some cases, the 
oligarchs receive a large share of their assets’ market value, in others just a fraction.17 
Therefore any wealth estimate based on the assets’ market value (as those provided by 
                                                 
16 The Moscow Times, ‘Tycoons Talk Corruption in Kremlin’, 20 February 2003: 5. 
17 As the threatpoint is the full expropriation, one should expect that even if assets are acquired by the 
state at the market value, the seller is asked to make substantial side payments. A prominent Russian 
journalist Yulia Latynina suggests that this was the case in the purchase of Sibneft from Abramovich 
(Echo Moskvy, 11 March 2006, www.echo.msk.ru/programmes/code/42280).    14
Forbes) may substantially overestimate the true wealth of the oligarchs; the wealth 
depends both on the value of the assets and on the relationship with the government. 
 
In the next year or two the nationalization of the key oligarch-controlled assets will 
continue. At the time of writing the paper, 4 out of 22 groups in the Table 3 are 
nationalized (Abramovich’s Sibneft, the main division of Khodorkovsky’s Yukos, 
Kadannikov’s Avtovaz, Bendukidze’s UMZ) and 2-3 more nationalizations are being 
discussed. Given the notorious inefficiency and corruption of Russian bureaucracy, 
these companies will eventually have to be reprivatized. If they are privatized in an open 
and competitive fashion, the public will respect the new owners’ property rights which 
will in turn result in efficient incentives to invest. Yet another option is to reprivatize 
these companies to dispersed owners. This will provide Russian middle class with a 
stake in the financial development and economic growth and even increase their 
personal wealth. As shown in Megginson (2005), privatization IPOs are usually 
underpriced by about 30 per cent. Yet, if government fails to enforce post-IPO corporate 
governance, the dispersed owners may fail to reap the value of their investment.  
 
Whether a direct sale to a strategic investor or share issue privatization (SIP) is selected 
or the two approaches are combined is yet to be seen. In principle, these companies are 
sufficiently large so that SIPs may be more efficient (Megginson 2005). The 
management of state-owned companies is biased towards SIP; indeed, if they have 
stakes in their companies, they would rather benefit from a liquid market where they 
can cash in. They will also be better-off under dispersed ownership as there will be less 
shareholder monitoring so they will preserve the private benefits of control.  
 
However, the most important choice is not the one of the method of privatization but 
about the government’s commitment to transparent rules of reprivatization.18 If the 
privatization auctions/IPOs are rigged again, the new buyers will benefit in the short 
term, but the vicious circle of illegitimate property rights will result in another 
expropriation. This may create a stable equilibrium like in Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2001)—high wealth inequality breeds support for expropriation, but as political 
institutions are underdeveloped, the redistribution benefits the bureaucrats (who become 
the new rich) rather than the poor; therefore high inequality may persist for quite a 
while.  
 
                                                 
18 A reprivatization of Krivoryzhstal in Ukraine provide an important illustration of the argument 
(Kramer and Timmons 2005). In 2004, this crown jewel of Ukrainian steel industry was privatized to two 
out of three most influential Ukrainian oligarchs at US$0.85 billion. The public outrage over the rigged 
auction was one of the important drivers of the Ukrainian Orange Revolution. The new government 
cancelled the privatization of the plant and resold it in an open tender for US$4.8 billion to a leading 
global player. The high price and the transparency of the auction have secured public support for the 
property rights.    15
4.1  Measuring inequality in the presence of super-rich individuals: evidence from 
Moscow income tax data  
Given the presence of a score of billionaires and another 0.2 per cent households of 
millionaires in Russia, one has to question the reliability of the Gini indices that are 
obtained through household surveys. Indeed, all the estimates of Gini for Russia are 
based on surveys of households that probably include none of the millionaires. As these 
super-rich own a substantial share of the national wealth, including them should change 
the Gini estimates significantly.19  
 
In order to check the potential bias in Gini data, we looked at data that describes income 
(albeit not wealth) of all Moscow residents including most of the Russian billionaires in 
Table 3 and probably many of the 88,000 millionaires (the number of millionaires in 
Russia in 2004 according to World Wealth Report 2005). This is the database of 2004 
income tax paid by and/or withheld on behalf of all Moscow residents built by Moscow 
tax inspections and leaked to the public domain.20  
 
The database contains more than 9 million entries; there can be several entries per 
person when a person receives income from multiple sources. We have concentrated on 
labour income as the other income categories are negligible;21 in any case, including 
them would further increase our Gini estimate. Russia’s tax code provides incentives to 
distribute profits as wage payments to owners (the corporate profit tax is 24 per cent, 
while the personal income tax is 13 per cent  and the social payments by employers are 
regressive reaching 2 per cent marginal rates for wages above $20,000 a year). After 
adding all labour income entries for each individual and cleaning obvious typos, we 
ended up with 6.1 million taxpayers. These included the very rich Russians although 
their incomes were far below the increase in their wealth as estimated by Forbes. The 
top income is only $15 million; a median billionaire has only earned $1.5 million in 
2004. Figure 6 presents the distribution. 
 
Even with these modest estimates of the incomes of Russian billionaires, our estimates 
for inequality are striking. The top 10 per cent of individuals earn 50 per cent of the 
total income. The Gini coefficient is 0.625! The official data for Gini in Russia in 2004 
are 0.407. The independent representative (but a much smaller) RLMS household 
survey provides a Gini of 0.345 for the total income and 0.461 for the labour income 
(Table 4).  
 
                                                 
19 World Bank (2006) estimates that if the rich were included into household surveys in Azerbajan, Gini 
would go up from 0.20 to 0.45-0.55. 
20 Vedomosti (2005) discusses the authenticity of the database. 
21 The only exception is the ‘income from selling securities’ category. These however turned out to be a 
proxy for financial intermediation—the highest incomes in this category included only brokerage house 
owners and employees.    16
Figure 6: The distribution of annual income in Moscow based on income tax data 
Note: The horizontal axis: ln(income) where income is in rubles; the exchange rate was US$1=29 rubles. 
 
How do the inequality estimates for Moscow compare to that for Russia? There are no 
official regional estimates of inequality in Russia, and RLMS is not regionally 
representative.22 We have used the National survey of household budgets and access to 
social services (NOBUS). NOBUS was conducted in 2003 and covered about 117 
thousand individuals in 79 regions. NOBUS is both nationally and regionally 
representative. In Moscow NOBUS includes 2,100 respondents out of which 1,139 
provided information on their labour income. As expected this survey does not cover the 
top income quantiles of Muscovites. The median income in NOBUS is about the same 
as in the tax data, but the mean is substantially lower. The top NOBUS income would 
be in the richest 2 per cent in the tax data, however, already the second richest NOBUS 
respondent is only at the top 10 per cent of the tax data. Therefore it is not surprising 
that NOBUS estimate for Gini is only 0.279. 
                                                 
22 Russian Statistics Agency (Rosstat, formerly Goskomstat) publishes regional Gini coefficients but the 
methodology is at best problematic. Goskomstat assumes that the true distribution is lognormal, and 
calculate the distribution’s parameters using median and mean from regional household surveys. The 
median and mean are also adjusted to account for the gap between survey-based and macroeconomic 
accounts-based aggregate incomes. Interestingly, this methodology does result in a very high Gini for 
Moscow close to ours. But Moscow is even more problematic as it stands out in Goskomstat 
methodology as the only region for which Goskomstat adjusts the distribution manually by assigning 
weights that are somewhat arbitrary. We are grateful to Goskomstat and to Ruslan Yemtsov for 
describing this methodology to us.  
Median $2,000  Mean $4,000 
Subsistence level 
$1,000  17
Table 4: Gini estimates in Russia in 2004, according to various sources 
Source Gini  coefficient 
Household Budget Survey, Goskomstat, Russia  0.407 
Russian longitudinal monitoring Survey (RLMS), labour income   0.345 
Russian longitudinal monitoring Survey (RLMS), total income   0.461 
National survey of household budgets and access to social 
services (NOBUS), labour income, Moscow, 2003 
0.279 
Tax income data, labour income, Moscow   0.625 
 
One of the potential problems with the tax data is that there may be a much higher 
degree of income underreporting at the lower end of the distribution rather at the top 
end. In order to provide a very conservative lower bound for our estimate, we replaced 
all income below the minimum living standard (about $2.7 a day) with the minimum 
living standard. Even in this case (which assumes away any poverty in Moscow) we 
obtain a Gini coefficient of 0.563.  
 
These results should be taken with a grain of salt, as there are numerous caveats. Yet, 
this simple exercise suggests that in the presence of very rich individuals, the regular 
household surveys that exclude such individuals substantially underestimate 
inequality—by as much as 10-15 Gini percentage points. In particular, income 
inequality in Russia may be much higher than we believe; it can be at the level of 
Brazil, rather than at the level of the US. The data issues are therefore even more 
important than they seem to be at the first glance. 
5 Policy  issues 
Is there a simple solution for the wealth inequality problem? Given high corruption 
(often driven by the very same inequality), redistribution does not necessarily benefit 
the poor. And unless the corruption is reined in, the expropriation of oligarchs will only 
create new oligarchs. It is therefore crucial to remove the fundamental cause of growth 
in wealth inequality, the ‘institutional economies of scale’. As the market and 
government institutions are underdeveloped, the rich have an advantage in furthering 
their riches while the poor are denied opportunity. The transition countries should 
therefore focus on providing equal access to education and healthcare,23 to the judiciary 
system and to financial markets.  
 
The institutional reforms of the kind require government’s commitment. Unfortunately, 
commitment to reform is in turn harder to assure in unequal societies; high wealth 
inequality reduces stability of economic policy in both democratic and authoritarian 
                                                 
23 In this respect, the transition countries, especially the CIS, are yet to make the turnaround (World Bank 
2005b). The access to public goods, to quality education and healthcare is still not improving after a 
decline in the beginning of transition, and the situation is especially dire for the poor.   18
regimes (in the latter, the stability of the regime itself is undermined). In the CEE 
countries, such commitment is provided by the outside anchor of the EU accession and 
most of the preconditions for reducing the inequality are already in place.  
 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries have mostly lagged behind the 
accession countries in terms of building market institutions, albeit to a varying extent. 
The list of institutions to be introduced is long. First, households need to have access to 
savings, investment, credit and insurance. For this, the government should support 
competition in the financial markets, but also introduce prudential regulation, regulation 
of stock market, credit history bureaus, deposit insurance system. Second, property 
rights for real estate should be established and the real estate market should be efficient. 
This is a major innovation for post-communist countries and it requires an overhaul of 
legislation and creation of a land registry. Third, the government should protect the 
property rights of entrepreneurs, both from racketeering and from predation from its 
own corrupt bureaucrats.  
 
Every CIS country has taken some of the steps above and none has completed all of 
them. It is probably going to take more time than the reformers envisioned in the 
beginning of transition. While these institutions benefit the median voter, the problem is 
that in some of these countries the democratic transition is stifled or even reversed. 
Hence the policy choices may be biased in favour of the ruling elite which is happy to 
continue redistribution from the middle class. Moreover, reducing the wealth inequality 
may empower the middle class and therefore endanger the power of the entrenched 
elites. Thus it remains to be seen whether and how CIS countries manage to break out 
from the high inequality trap.   
6 Conclusions 
Given the lack of reliable data on personal wealth, it is hard to speculate on the 
evolution of personal wealth and of wealth inequality in transition countries. Yet, the 
indirect evidence points to a stark increase both in average personal wealth and in 
wealth inequality, especially in the former Soviet Union. While much of the income 
inequality is explained by the wage decompression, the wealth inequality was in many 
cases driven by privatization and subsequent consolidation of ownership. In particular, 
in Russia, the transition resulted in an emergence of a new class of rich individuals. 
While these oligarchs have restructured their companies and lobbied for further pro-
market reforms, the median voter’s perception of their illegitimacy has undermined the 
government’s incentive to continue reforms. It is therefore not surprising that in Russia, 
as well as in the other CIS countries, inequality has remained high and reforms, that 
could eventually bring it down, have been abandoned or even reversed. On the other 
hand, in the CEE countries, the outside anchor of EU accession has provided the 
governments with a commitment device to introduce institutions for greater equality of 
opportunity.   19
Like many other papers on wealth inequality, ours concludes by restating the obvious 
need for more data. To illustrate the sheer extent of potential mismeasurement, we have 
estimated Gini index for income using the only database that includes Russia’s super-
rich individuals; we found that the official data may underestimate Gini by about 25 
percentage points. The wealth inequality data are probable even more distorted. An 
informed policy debate can only be based on reliable and comparable data on personal 
wealth coming from representative household surveys which would indeed include 
some very rich individuals. Unfortunately, such data are still non-existent.  
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Appendix  
Table A1: Monetization M2/GDP in transition countries and in the US 
  1994 1997 2000  2003 
Czech  Republic  65 65 63  70 
Croatia  16 35 42  63 
Slovak  Republic  56 60 60  61 
Albania ..  55  59  58 
Slovenia  29 39 44  53 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  ..  ..  26  47 
Hungary  48 43 43  45 
Bulgaria  62 21 33  45 
Poland  30 31 39  42 
Estonia  24 26 32  38 
Latvia  29 22 25  33 
Ukraine  15 12 16  30 
Macedonia,  FYR  21 12 18  30 
Lithuania  21 16 21  29 
Moldova  12 19 19  28 
Russian  Federation  14 18 18  26 
Romania  15 18 20  22 
Kazakhstan 8  9  13  19 
Kyrgyz Republic  ..  12  11  15 
Belarus ..  12  12  14 
Armenia 7  8  13  14 
Turkmenistan 14  8  14  .. 
Azerbaijan  30 12 13  13 
Georgia ..  7  9  11 
Tajikistan  .. .. 7  7 
USA  57 56 61  67 
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
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Figure A1: The ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP  






























































































Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
 